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Children of Choice: A Doctor's Perspective
Howard W Jones, Jr.*
The introduction of in vitro fertilization (IVF) into North America m the
early 1980s brought unanticipated and vigorous opposition from orthodox
moral theologians of several traditions and from right-to-life groups, who
erroneously equated IVF with abortion. If IVF proponents, including
myself, had known of John Robertson and his advocacy of the constitutional
concept of procreative liberty at the time, we would have found considerable
protection behind the constitutional shield of procreative liberty As simple
IVF has grown to include donor sperm, donor eggs, cryopreservation, a
variety of microtechnques, and other permutations and combinations known
as Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), procreative liberty and John
Robertson have become staunch allies of these technologies. Procreative
liberty has indeed shielded these procedures and may even shield some
procedures that do not yet exist. Therefore, the medical practitioner can find
comfort in giving presumptive priority to procreative liberty when seeking
to resolve the legal issues surrounding new reproductive technologies.
L Various Perceptions of Procreation
Nonetheless, in the consulting and examining rooms, the fact that
procreative liberty may have presumptive priority from a legal perspective
is but one consideration that the physician must examine when attempting to
resolve the patient's dilemma. As this Article will show, many consider-
ations other than legal ones impinge on reproductive problems and options,
such as contraception, elective termination of pregnancy, the pathological
condition of repeated miscarriage, and problems with menopause. To
sharpen the focus of this discussion, however, I will limit my study to those
patients who suffer from infertility
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What indeed is procreative liberty as it exists between the doctor and
patient?
To establish what procreative liberty means m a particular situation, it
often helps to ask infertility patients an important preliminary question:
"Why do you want a baby?" In my twenty or more years of asking this
question, I have elicited a variety of responses.
" Sometimes I get an astonished stare, which conveys the message that
the questioner must be slightly daft, to say the least. Other times, there is
an expressionless silence for a prolonged period of time.
Couples in these categories probably have not thought about tis
preliminary question specifically and, as events unfold, seem to represent
those who think that children follow marriage like night follows day
Medical follow-through in tis group is problematic and spotty Some of
these couples are from the religious right and are comfortable m explaining
reproductive vagaries in terms of "the Will of God." I remember one couple
who consulted me after ten years of infertility, and then only on the urging
of a friend who had been successfully treated at my clinic. The patient was
a schoolteacher, and her husband was a lawyer - both highly educated
individuals. Although they rmssed a few appointments along the way, they
did finally complete the work-up, which revealed a condition likely amenable
to IVF This therapy was too much for their convictions, however, and they
disappeared, hopefully better prepared to accept childlessness as a result of
being confronted by the preliminary question.
* "From childhood, as I played with dolls, I fantasized and anticipated
marriage and motherhood. Not to have a baby shatters my childhood
dreams." Tis response calls for a second question: "And what does your
husband think of all tus?" The answer is usually reassuring, but it
sometimes gives the impression that the sought-for baby is really a replace-
ment for the childhood doll. How important is it in tis situation for the
physician to initiate a discussion on the seriousness of childbearing and the
responsibilities, as well as the joys and rewards of parenting?
Edgar Guest, a populist poet of the early twentieth century, put it this
way-
"How much do babies cost?" said he
The other night upon my knee;
And then I said: "They cost a lot;
A lot of watching by a cot,
A lot of sleepless hours and care,
A lot of heart-ache and despair,
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A lot of fear and trying dread,
And sometimes many tears are shed
In payment for our babies small,
But every one is worth it all."'
• "To tell you the truth, my husband and I have been having a problem
- we have even seen a marriage counselor. I think a baby would help."
Sometimes it turns out that the husband is unaware that the wife is seeking
help. The physician, of necessity, automatically and instantly becomes a
marriage counselor, however reluctantly Is reproduction an individual
choice m this circumstance?
Childbearing is only the first event m the life-long process of parenting.
A conscientious doctor might be expected to consider the rearing environ-
ment. Indeed, the Code of Practice of the Human Fertilization and
Embryology Authority, the British governmental agency that oversees ART,
requires the assisting physician to consider the welfare of the potential child,
including the presence of a father. There are studies that seem to indicate
that childbearing, particularly if multiple children are involved, is a strain on
the marital relationship. It may even be the final event that ruptures the tie
that binds.
9 "My slowness in becoming pregnant has not seemed so important until
recently It turns out now that all of our friends have little ones. We feel
isolated - we are social outcasts among our circle of longtime friends."
Such an answer raises the suspicion that procreation for this couple is not for
childbearing or rearing a child, per se, but rather to achieve parental social
acceptability Once again, the physician must open a discussion regarding
the welfare of the potential child.
* Not infrequently, the question brings tears and no immediate verbal
reply Tis response often comes from those who harbor guilt. For one
reason or another, some patients believe that some past act on their part is
responsible for their present predicament. Often this is true, but not always.
For this group, procreation is very important because one of its purposes is
to help the couple live with themselves. If necessary, they will use almost
any facet of ART
* "I like children, I am a pediatric nurse, kindergarten teacher, or
pediatric social worker, etc. and find myself lonely without children of my
1. EDGARA. GUEST, What aBaby Costs, in COLLECTED VERSE OF EDGAR A. GUEST
5 (1934).
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own." A gung-ho answer. The physician can expect great cooperation from
this patient, and hopefully from her husband, although it should be noted that
in her reply, she used the singular personal pronoun. The infertility
specialist likes to hear "WE."
* "I have a new husband who has no children, and I am anxious to have
a child for him." This answer obviously comes from a second- (or third-)
time married mother who typically is older, sometimes by several years, than
her latest husband.
This is an increasingly frequent response as a result of the contemporary
acceptability of sequential partners. This couple will surely be cooperative
during the "honeymoon" phase of the new marriage. But they nevertheless
face the troubling influence of the female partner's advanced reproductive
age. As the unavoidable tests become more and more intrusive, the female
partner reveals, often inadvertently, by a missed appointment or by a
conflicting obligation preventing an appointment, that she might be just as
happy if pregnancy does not occur. After all, she does have children, and the
suspicion is enhanced that the infertility work-up is only to please her
husband. Tis is, of course, quite laudable, but she nevertheless conveys an
unexpressed hope that the investigation will not be successful.
* "My husband and I have a very happy marriage, but have been
distressed that we have not had a child. I think we will make ideal parents.
We hope the problem can be solved."
If there is a best answer, this is certainly the one. Notice that it is
expressed in terms of "we" rather than "I." It is expressed in terms of the
long-range opportunity to parent, as well as to have a child. Fortunately,
this answer, m one or another form, is the one most frequently heard as an
answer to the first question.
Childbearing is only the first step to a life-long commitment. Perhaps
society would be better if not only the infertile, but the fertile as well, asked
themselves prior to attempting to get pregnant - "Why do we want a baby9 "
The preliminary question helps orient the physician to the patient's
concept of procreation, but there are other clinical situations that speak to the
meaning of procreating for some patients. For example, the situation in
which the husband is sperm-deficient, and the wife requests surreptitious
donor insemination, or the situation in which the clinician discovers motile
sperm m the cervix of the woman whose husband has no sperm.
I believe that a physician should expose the patient to the notion that
human procreation is purposeful, not only a matter of becoming preg-
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nant - a child should be a child of choice, and child rearmg is implicit in
that choice. I will discuss later the importance of family in child rearing, but
it can be mentioned that, from an evolutionary point-of-view, the higher in
the evolutionary scale, the longer the time required to prepare the offspring
to be on its own, that is, prepared to "join the herd." The anthropological
evidence is intriguing and persuasive that family formation is important.
Therefore, to the physician, procreation must be legal, but the doctor must
also give consideration to other factors, including the welfare of any
offspring.
If the shifting of a presumed priority from an individual to a shared
biological interest involving a couple and potential child has any merit, it
excludes procreation as defined from the unpaired individual and raises
serious doubts about procreation by individuals of the same sex.
H. Procreative Liberty - A Shared Interest
John Robertson recognizes procreative liberty in the context of the
couple, but clearly states that it is first and foremost an individual interest.
2
I must point out, as a clinician, that an interventional interest in procreative
liberty can function only if it comcides with the individual interest of a
heterosexual partner. The clinician must deal with two individual interests,
neither of which can have presumptive priority, especially as to some
technology and to some clinical circumstances. This view does not exclude
the use of donors, however, the use of donors requires meticulous attention
to the details involved in each individual interest.
This shared interest is based on the simple biological fact that to start
the procreative process, the part typically referred to as insemination, a
female gamete from one individual is required, and a male gamete from
another individual is required. However, procreation involves more than
merely isemnation. In my view, procreation also involves rearing the
potential child. If the parents fail to rear the child, then procreation has not
been fulfilled. Reference has been made to the anthropological evidence.
In the barnyard or on the range, insemination takes place only when the
female is in heat - when she gives an external sign indicating that she is
ovulating. She will not accept the male at any other time. Any resulting
offspring requires minimal attention and promptly joins the herd, probably
not identifying its father.
2. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 24 (1994).
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In humans, the external sign of ovulation has been lost, and insemina-
tion is necessary throughout the menstrual cycle to assure insemination at the
time of ovulation. Modem science has identified the time of ovulation, but
until the twentieth century, the necessity for, or the time of, ovulation m the
human were unknown. Furthermore, human offspring require care for a
prolonged period of time measured m years before they can join the human
herd on anything like equal terms. The family serves this purpose. Thus,
the concept that procreation not only involves the germ cells from two
people, but also rearing, is rooted in the biological and sociological aspects
of reproduction and human interaction.
I. Legislation and Reproduction
From the point-of-view of the clinician, what should be the role of
legislation m human reproduction, especially when reproduction involves the
use of ART9 I do not believe that projected biological events are a
productive topic for serious biolegal discussion. Discussions of these
tentative situations make delightful cocktail conversation, but often lead one
down the primrose path. The biologically uninformed often cannot
distinguish fact from fiction. For example, it is inpossible at the present
time to irject DNA from a dead mammal or other creature into an egg and,
thereby, clone the dead creature. Indeed, the biological facts are that this
cannot be done with DNA at all in any circumstance - DNA packaged in
chromosomes must be obtained from very early pre-embryos for cloning to
occur in any sense. Jurassic Park is intriguing, but it is still fiction. Thus,
contemplating legislation requires a thorough and unambiguous biological
understanding of the problem that the proposed legislation seeks to remedy
It is clear that "housekeeping" type problems can benefit from
legislation. These include such things as recogmzmg rearing parents as the
legal parents of children born from the use of donor gametes, and excluding
the donor from rights or obligations. Many states have laws regarding male
donors, and a few states have now included female donors. Some effort to
achieve uniformity among the states would seem to be a worthy goal.
Some people may think it inappropriate, for a variety of reasons, to use
extraconjugal gametes. They, of course, are not required to do so. The
"housekeeping" legislation referred to above legalizes the use of extra-
conjugal gametes for procreation by identifying the legal parents, specifying
rights, and limiting liability There are many states without laws, however,
and it is therefore reassuring for those who operate in such states that legal
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scholars like John Robertson regard the use of extraconjugal gametes as
falling under the umbrella of the constitutional right to privacy
Cryopreservation has the potential to create additional litigation,
especially over the proper disposition of unused or unwanted cryopreserved
material. These difficulties have arisen because of a failure to have a clear
agreement between the parties as to an alternative disposition of the
cryopreserved material m the event it is not required or used for procreation
by the initiating couple. Specifically, some of the problems may be as
follows:
1. Death or disability of one or both prospective parents.
2. Legal separation of the prospective parents.
3. Divorce of the prospective parents.
4. The cryopreserved material remains m storage beyond the reproduc-
tive limit of the prospective mother, or beyond some other agreed-
upon time limit.
5. Loss of contact with the prospective parents, resulting from failure
to pay current or delinquent cryopreservations and charges, and
other unpredictable reasons.
6. Loss of interest by the prospective parents in attempting a preg-
nancy
7 Wish of one prospective parent to remove the cryopreserved
material from the original program.
8. Wish of both prospective parents to remove the cryopreserved
material from the original program.
9 Voluntary or involuntary discontinuation of a cryopreserved
program by a program of assisted reproduction.'
In an effort to circumvent these problems, the Norfolk IVF program requires
candidates for cryopreservation to sign an agreement in which they designate
the ultimate disposition of the cryopreserved material in the event some of
the circumstances mentioned above occur.4
This agreement has not been tested in court, but there do not seem to
have been any problems to date. In view of the current apparent absence of
problems regarding cryopreserved material, it seems doubtful that legislation
covering these problems should be pursued at this time. However, it needs
3. See Howard W Jones, Jr., Cryopreservation and Its Problems, 53 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 780, 780 (1990).
4. See Howard W Jones, Jr. et al., A Step Toward Solving Some of the Problems of
Cryopreservation, 57 FERTILITY & STERILITY 278, 279-84 (1992).
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to be noted that there is probably a very large number of cryopreserved pre-
embryos in storage at this time and that it is unlikely that all will be used for
the intended purpose of the originators. Many of these pre-embryos are
probably not covered by agreements such as the one referred to above.
IV The Legal Definition of Personhood
The time during development when the conceptus acquires personhood
has been debated without consensus for centuries. The U.S. courts have
faced this issue in one way or another in mid- and late development, most
notably in Roe v Wade.5 However, there seem to be only two cases m
which tis question became an issue during very early development, that is,
during the pre-embryonic period (the first 14 days). In Davis v Davis,6 the
trial judge applied the laws of custody, i.e., he regarded the concepti as
persons. It is irrelevant to this discussion that his decision was later
overturned. On the other hand, in York v Jones,7 the trial judge regarded
the concepti as chattel. The physician-observer smiles as he notes the same
biological phenomenon referred to as such different entities. It seems that,
from a legal perspective, a conceptus must be either a person or a thing. I
cannot help but wonder if the law should examine the proposition that the
biological conceptus prior to the acquisition of personhood occupies a unique
and previously unrecognized legal status that is neither chattel nor human.
If there is any merit to tis notion, it is a project for the academic legal
community to explore. Justice Blackmun, m ins opinion in Roe v Wade,
traced the history of thought concerning the acquisition of personhood. That
discussion might be a good starting point for this new project to begin.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, 59
U.S.L.W 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aft'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
7 717 F Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
